The Flow of Capital Funds in the Postwar Economy by Raymond W. Goldsmith
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Flow of Capital Funds in the Postwar Economy






Chapter Author: Raymond W. Goldsmith
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1679
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 21)THE FLOW OF CAPITAL FUNDS
IN THE POSTWAR ECONOMYSummary
THIS summary is arranged in two parts. The first deals with the gen-
eral characteristics of the American capital market during the post-
war period; the second with the flow of funds through the five main
sectors of the capital market which constitute the core of the study
—the markets for Treasury and state and local government securities,
for corporate bonds and stocks, and for residential mortgages. Whereas
the second part is limited to a brief summary of the main findings
presented in Chapters 6 through 10, the first part covers some aspects
that were not specifically discussed in the report, but may be help-
ful in understanding postwar capital market developments. Emphasis
here is on the characteristics of the American capital market in the
postwar period that distinguish its structure and operation from the
prewar periods that were not affected by war or the Great Depression,
i.e., in particular between the turn of the century and World War I
and the 1920's. The report deals with the years 1946 through 1958,
generally referred to as the postwar period, but the first part of the
summary occasionally also takes account of developments during 1959—
61, which are not covered in the tables.
General Characteristics of the Postwar Capital Markets
1. On a national scale the financing task is measured by the volume
of gross capital formation, since funds equal in size to gross capital
formation must be withheld from current consumption out of na-
tional product. During the postwar period gross capital formation
averaged $39 billion a year under the narrowest concept, which covers
only business structures (excluding residences), business equipment,
and net foreign balance; $66 billion under the standard concept, which
also includes residential structures and government civilian capital
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formation; and $108 billion under a broader concept, which is more
consistent in that it separates durable from nondurable output and
therefore also embraces consumer durables and military construction
and equipment. These figures amount to 12 per cent of gross national
product for the narrow concept, 20 per cent for the standard concept,
and 29 per cent for the broad concept, including consumer durables
and government tangible assets.
2. Measured by the share of civilian gross or net capital formation,
the relative size of the financing task in the postwar period was about
the same as over the previous fifty years, excluding periods affected
by war or the Great Depression (see Tables 16 and 19). Gross capital
formation under the standard definition averaged slightly above one-
fifth of gross national product for most decades since the turn of the
century (and indeed since 1869)—a ratio about the same as that ob-
served during the postwar period. If consumer durables are included,
the ratio for the postwar years is even slightly above that for the ear-
lier periods. On a net basis, the ratio of capital formation to national
product in the postwar period is somewhat below the level prevail-
ing before 1930, particularly if consumer durables are excluded. This
points to a shift between internal and external financing, but does
not influence the relative size of the total financing task.'
3. For the operation of the capital market, great importance at-
taches to the forms which capital formation takes and to the sectors
which undertake it. While all of the three main sectors—business,
households, and government—use both internal and external funds to
finance their capital expenditures, the ratios of the two types of funds
differ, as do the factors which affect the distribution and the total
volume of capital expenditures. Similarly, the forms of external financ-
ing differ among sectors—governments and households, for instance,
being unable to issue equity securities. Within sectors the forms of
external financing also differ, depending on the character of capital
expenditures, capital structure, the cost of funds of different types,
and many other factors.
4. The sectoral distribution of capital expenditures during the post-
war period showed a continuation of trends observed for more than
half a century before 1930, namely, an increase in the share of house-
holds and governments and a decrease in the share of business in total
national capital expenditures. During the postwar period, households
1SeeTables 12—16 for gross capital expenditures and Tables 17—20 for net in-
vestment.
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accounted for well over two-fifths of total capital formation if con-
sumer durables are included (about one-fourth if they are excluded),
business for a little less than two-fifths, and civilian government for
one-tenth. This compares with shares in the last three decades of the
nineteenth century and the first three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury of 40 per cent for households (23 and 18 per cent excluding con-
sumer durables), 56 and 54 per cent for business, and 3 and 6 per cent
for government.2 Within the business sector, a substantial increase
took place in the share of equipment at the expense of that of struc-
tures. Thus there was a considerable increase in the share of expendi-
tures on capital goods of relatively short life—machinery, vehicles, and
consumer durables—in the private economy, partly offset in national
capital formation by an increase in the share of government construc-
tion.
5. For the economy as a whole, gross capital expenditures (includ-
ing military) absorbed nearly two-thirds of all capital funds used dur-
ing the postwar period if the sources-and-uses-of-funds statements of
the seven main sectors (nonfarm households, agriculture, unincorpo-
rated business enterprises, nonfinancial corporations, financial institu-
tions, state and local governments, federal government) are combined.
Among the acquisition of financial assets and accounting for the re-
maining one-third of total uses of capital funds, short-term claims
were lower than long-term claims, absorbing 15 and 19 per cent of
total uses of capital funds, respectively. Net purchases of equity se-
curities by the different sectors absorbed only 2 per cent of total funds
used (see Table 21). The smallness of this ratio is due partly to the
breadth of the sectors used; e.g., all net purchases and sales of equity
securities within the nonfarm household sector are eliminated in the
consolidated figures for the sector.
6. On a national scale the distribution of capital funds among
sources is necessarily closely connected with that of uses. Thus about
two-thirds of total sources represented gross saving and slightly over
one-third external financing. Of gross saving, in turn, about two-thirds
were provided by earned depreciation allowances if the latter are cal-
culated uniformly for all sectors on a straight-line basis and at re-
placement cost. The remaining one-third of total internal sources rep-
resented the net saving of the various sectors. The importance of the
2Thefigures for 1869—1929 are from unpublished worksheets underlying the R
tables in Simon Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy: Its Formation and
Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1961.
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distribution of internal financing among earned depreciation allow-
ances and net saving obviously differs among and within sectors; it
also depends on how conscious the different economic units are of the
distinction between gross and net saving and capital formation, and
on how much this distinction influences their investment and saving
decisions.
7. Substantial differences in the structure of uses and sources of
capital funds are apparent between the main sectors. The share of
gross capital expenditures in total funds used varied (excluding finan-
cial institutions) between two-thirds for nonfarm households and
nearly 100 per cent for the federal government. Unincorporated busi-
ness devoted nearly nine-tenths of the available funds to gross capital
expenditures, agriculture 93 per cent, and nonfarm business 83 per
cent (see Table 27).
8. The importance of external financing was largest for nonfinan-
cial corporations, for which it accounted for more than two-fifths of
all funds used (again excluding financial institutions). State and local
governments and nonfarm unincorporated business enterprises were
next with about one-third of total funds used, but this ratio does not
have a very precise meaning for unincorporated business enterprises.
External financing was relatively least important for nonfarm house-
holds for which it furnished less than one-fifth of total capital funds,
for agriculture with one-eighth, and for the federal government with
one-twentieth (see Table 27). Differences among sectors existed also
in the structure of external financing. Examples are: first, nonfinan-
cial corporations, which in the postwar period were by far the largest
users of external funds, raised nearly one-half of total outside funds
in the form of short-term liabilities, two-fifths through long-term debt,
and about one-seventh through the sale of new equity securities; sec-
ond, nonfarm households secured one-third of them on a short-term
and two-thirds on a long-term basis, the latter in the form of home
mortgages (see Table 24).
9. Possibly as important as the level and distribution of financing
during the postwar period is a comparison with financing in earlier
periods not affected by wars or the Great Depression. Such a compari-
son shows that changes in the structure of uses and sources of funds
have been relatively small for the whole economy or the seven main
sectors for which the statistics are available.
On a national basis, the shares of gross capital expenditures in total
uses and of internal and external financing in total sources were about
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the same in 1901—12 and 1923—29 as in the postwar period.8 Within
external financing, however, some substantial and significant changes
occurred. The share of equity financing, not more than 5 per cent of
total external financing in the postwar period, wasnoteven, half as
large as in the two prewar periods when it is estimated at one-seventh
and one-fifth. The near equality between short- and long-term bor-
rowing observed in the postwar years was also found in 190 1—12, and
in 1923—29. However, in comparison to the 1920's, the relative im-
portance of long-term liabilities increased in the postwar period.
Similar trends are found in the financing of nonfinancial corpora-
tions. The share of external financing in total capital funds was about
the same in 190 1—12 and 1923—29 as in the postwar years. Recourse
to the issuance of equity securities, however, was sharply lower, a ratio
to total external financing of one-sixth in the postwar period compared
with about one-third for 1901—12 and more than two-fifths for 1923—
29. In the case of nonfarm households, financing methods in the Post-
war period were very similar to those observed in the 1920's, but quite
different from those prevailing between the turn of the century and
World War I. Both in the postwar period and the 1920's, external
financing provided something more than one-sixth of total funds, and
long-term borrowing accounted for over three-fifths of total external
financing. From 1901 to 1912, on the other hand, external financing
was responsible for only one-twelfth of total funds used and long- and
short-term borrowing were of about equal importance.
10. The postwar period is characterized by a fairly steady rise in
the level of interest rates, evidencing an excess demand for funds over
the available supply. This rise reflects only in part the fact that un-
til 1950 the Federal Reserve System supported the price of long-term
Treasury securities, and thus kept their rates somewhat lower than
they otherwise would have been and indirectly also influenced the
level of other interest rates. If there are long swings of forty to fifty
years' duration in the level of interest rates, as is possible though far
from proven, the postwar period probably constitutes the major part
of a long upswing, following the long downswing of 1920—45, and
parallels the preceding long upswing from the late 1890's to 1920.
Interest rates were at historically extremely low levels at the begin-
fling of the postwar period, but by 1958 they had reached the highest
levels witnessed since the early 1930's, although not the peaks of the
8 Kuznets, Capital in the American Economy, pp. 490,558,and unpublished work-
sheets underlying R tables. See also Table 23 of this book.
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early 1920's or the 1870's. New issues of long-term, high-grade corpo-
rate bonds ended the period at over 4 per cent compared to 2% per
cent in 1945, nearly 6 per cent at the peak of 1920, and somewhat less
than 4 per cent at the trough of the 1890's. No sharp changes occurred
during the postwar period in the differentials among the main types
of long-term interest rates. Short-term rates, however, rose relatively
more than long-term rates, Treasury bills advancing from the pegged
level of less than %percent in 1945 to an average of 214 per cent
during the 1954—58 cycle. The more relevant bank rates on short-term
business credits nearly doubled, rising from 2.34 per cent in 1945 to
4.34 per cent in 1958.
The second characteristic of the yield structure of the postwar pe-
riod is the divergent development of the yields of fixed interest-bear-
ing securities and of equities of the 1950's. Common stock yields (div-
idend-price ratios) advanced from approximately 4 per cent in 1945
to 6% per cent in 1949—50, a movement parallel to that of bond
yields. Then, however, they declined steadily to about 4 per cent in
1958, and continued downward through As a result, common
stock yields fell below the yields on new issues of high-grade bonds
beginning in 1958, a position duplicated only in These his-
torically abnormal yields relations, however, had no pronounced ef-
fect in the 1950's on the ratio of gross or net new issues of bonds to
flotations of stocks.
11. An important basic characteristic of the capital market is the
extent of the participation of financial institutions, i.e., primarily the
banking system, thrift institutions, and private and government insur-
ance organizations.
Between the end of 1945 and 1958, the assets of financial institutions
(excluding government lending agencies and personal trust funds ad-
ministered by banks) increased from about $352 billion to $704 bil-
lion, or at a rate of slightly more than 5% per cent per year. (During
the next three years they rose by another $100 billion or about 15
per cent.) This rate of growth is considerably below the 7% per cent
a year which was observed between 1900 and 1929, and also below the
average rate from 1929 to 1945.
Economically more relevant is the relation of the assets of financial
institutions to either national product or all financial assets. By these
4BusinessStatistics, Washington, 1961, p. 102.
Historical Statistics of the United States, Washington, 1960, p. 656, Series
X-335, X-339.
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tests, financial institutions during the postwar period just about kept
pace with the growth of the economy. The assets of financial institu-
tions were about 1.6 times gross national product in both 1945 and
1958. They were equal at both dates to somewhat more than one-third
of all financial assets in the United States.
12. The influence of financial institutions on individual sectors of
the capital market is reflected in the proportion of the main capital
market instruments held by these institutions. During the postwar
period financial institutions increased their share in four of the five
main instruments (state and local government securities, corporate
bonds and stocks, and residential mortgages), while their share in
Treasurysecuritiesoutstanding showed nosubstantialchange.
Throughout the period the role of financial institutions Was dominant
in the market for corporate bonds where their net purchases accounted
for more than nine-tenths of the net increase in supply, in the market
for residential mortgages where their share was almost as high, and,
of course, in the market for short-term credit. Their influence was
very great also in the market for state and local government securi-
ties since they absorbed about three-fifths of the net increase in sup-
ply, and in the market for Treasury securities, where statistical meas-
urement is difficult, since net changes over the postwar period as a
whole were very small in both the total amount outstanding and in
the holdings of financial institutions which remained at approxi-
mately two-thirds of the total. While financial institutions held less
than one-tenth of common stock outstanding at any time during the
postwar period, their role in the market for stock, except the stock
of investment companies and of closely held corporations, was much
more substantial, and their net purchases represented a large and
increasing fraction of total new issues.
18. The relatively small change in the position of financial inter-
mediaries in the postwar capital market contrasts with the substantial
advance over the preceding fifty or more years, particularly between
the Great Depression and World War II. Thus the share of the
financial assets of financial institutions in all financial assets outstand-
ing in the United States was somewhat less than one-fourth in 1900 and
in 1929, and increased to somewhat over one-third in 1939 and 1945.°
Similarly, the assets of financial institutions, which had been nine-
tenths of gross national product at the turn of the century, increased
6RaymondW. Goldsmith andRobertE. Lipsey, Studies in the National Balance
Sheet of the United States., Princeton for NBER, 1963, Vol. II, Table Ia.
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to 1.3 times GNP in 1929 and to twice GNP in compared to
the level of about 1.6 times GNP that prevailed throughout the post-
war period. It is, therefore, possible that the importance of financial
institutions in the capital market, which has been increasing since the
middle of the nineteenth century, is reaching a peak, and that the
share of the main types of financial institutions in capital market in-
struments is stabilizing, at least in the case of claims which constitute
the great majority of financial assets outstanding.
14. As a result of differences in the rate of growth of assets, con-
siderable shifts occurred during the postwar period in the distribution
of the aggregate assets of all financial institutions and, correspond-
ingly, in the role of the various groups of financial institutions in the
capital market.
The outstandin.g change was the decline in the share of the assets
of the banking system from three-fifths at the end of World War II
to two-fifths in 1958 or 1961. The share of commercial banks alone
fell from a little over two-fifths to not more than one-third of the
assets of all financial institutions. The decline of the share of the
banking system was due primarily to a reduction in the ratio of
money to national product or to financial assets. The ratio of time
and savings deposit departments in commercial banks to the total
assets of financial institutions actually increased slightly, from 9 to
10 per cent, so that the decline of the assets of the monetary system
proper (Federal Reserve System plus check deposit departments of
commercial banks) was even sharper.
Among the main groups of financial institutions other than the
monetary system, insurance organizations held their share between
1945 and 1958 at 48 per cent of the assets of all nonmonetary institu-
tions. The share of miscellaneous financial institutions remained at
about 17 per cent of the assets of all nonmonetary institutions, and
the share of thrift institutions, including the saving departments of
commercial banks, at above one-third (Table 5).
15. The shift between the monetary system and the nonmonetary
institutions is partly an offset to the extraordinary increase, in abso-
lute and relative terms, in the assets of the monetary system that
occurred during World War II accompanying the repressed inflation
of that period. The share of the monetary system in the total assets
of financial institutions in 1958 of about one-third, however, was con-
7ForGNP figures in 1900—29 and 1939, see Kuznets, Capital in the American
Economy, pp. 558 and 486 (Variant III).
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siderably below the proportion of 1939 of two-fifths. While it was
about the same as the 1929 ratio, it was substantially below that of
1900 (see Table 5). The stability of the share of thrift institutions
during the postwar period at one-third of the total assets of non-
monetary institutions contrasts with the downward trend observed
between 1900 and 1939. Even more significant is the stability in the
share of insurance organizations in the postwar period, which con-
trasts sharply with the increase between 1929 and 1945, an increase
due largely to the sharp rise in the assets of government insurance and
social security organizations.
16. Throughout the study, figures for averages of the three cycles
observed during the postwar period (1946—49, 1949—54, 1954—58) are
presented, compared, and commented upon. It is not possible to sum-
marize here the results of these comparisons, but the most important
fact is that the main relationships are very similar in the second and
third cycles, but are considerably different in the first cycle which was
strongly influenced by the transition from a war to a peacetime econ-
omy. In the financial sphere, this change meant primarily the rapid
disappearance of the overhang of liquid assets in excess of require-
ments which had accumulated during World War II, the end of the
retirement of substantial amounts of Treasury securities and the sharp
reduction of their holdings by banks and insurance companies, and
the abandonment of price support for Treasury securities by the Fed-
eral Reserve System. These three developments were essentially com-
pleted during or shortly after the end of the first cycle. Other differ-
ences between the first cycle, on the one hand, and the second and
third, on the other, were the increasing share of external financing,
and the decrease in the relative importance of short-term credit among
the sources of external financing.
17. In capital market techniques—as distinct from the size and direc-
tion of capital market flows—the changes during the postwar period,
although numerous, were not far-reaching, at least not compared with
the innovations during the 1920's or the 1930's. Changes in the char-
acter of capital market instruments, in the nature of the operations
of the different types of financial institutions, and in the structure of
the investment banking machinery were all in the same direction as
during the thirty years before World War II, and sometimes even
earlier.
An interesting example is the direct placement of corporate bonds,
one result of the increasing predominance of large institutional in-
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vestors in the market for corporate bonds and the registration pro-
visions of the Securities Act of 1933. During the postwar period, about
48 per cent of all corporate bonds offered were placed privately. This
is a very substantial proportion, but the share had already been as
high as 24 per cent from 1936 to 1940.8
In this and other instances, techniques initially developed during
the 1920's and 1930's became more commonly accepted and were in
many ways refined, but there was no basic change in the developments
during the postwar period.
18. There are, however, a few important features of postwar capi-
tal market techniques, the increasing use or modification of which are
sufficiently pronounced that these techniques can be reasonably re-
garded as postwar innovations.
The first of these is the widespread use of lease-back financing, under
which a financial institution acquires a building or plant and simul-
taneously leases it for a long term to an industrial or commercial enter-
prise to operate, and it becomes the property of the operator after the
stipulated lease payments have been made. Lease-back transactions
transform a loan into the purchase and sale of tangible property, and
transfer the physical assets involved from the balance sheet of the
operator and lessee to that of the owner and lessor, while leaving no
trace of the lease payment obligations on the balance sheet of either
lessee or lessor. (Since lease-back transactions do not give rise to the
issuance or retirement of financial instruments, they are not included
in the statistics on which this study is based.) No comprehensive data
exist of the volume or terms of lease-back financing, but it was no
doubt substantial compared to related forms of loan financing, i.e.,
private placements of corporate bonds and long-term loans of com-
mercial banks.
The second innovation is embodied in the specialized credit ar-
rangements developed for financing oil production, the construction
of oil and gas pipelines, service stations, tankers, and the erection and
operation of plants. These projects, mostly of large size
and involving lease-back transactions or assignments of revenues in
one form or another, were initiated largely by industrial groups and
involved primarily direct financing by institutions, chiefly commercial
banks, life insurance companies, and pension funds, without or with
only delayed recourse to a public offering of securities.
8Forpostwar period, Table 71. For 1936—40, 25th Annual Report of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Washington, 1959, pp. 222 and 226.
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19. While it is not possible to mention minor changes in capital
market techniques during the postwar period, it may be noted that
most of them reflect two general tendencies. The first of these is an
increasing flexibility in capital market instruments, such as repay-
ment schedules and substitution of collateral. The motive and effect
of these innovations were to tailor the contracts more and more closely
to the specific requirements of certain groups of borrowers and lenders.
The issuance of Treasury securities or finance company paper with
maturity dates that coincide with corporate tax instalments is a simple
example. Tax-exempt securities with unusually high or low initial or
final coupons are a more complicated one.°
The second tendency is the substitution of professional for lay
management of security portfolios and, more generally, of financial
assets. Examples are the purchase of investment company securities
or the participation in common trust funds instead of owner-manage-
ment of small and medium-sized holdings; the substitution of invest-
ment advisory or trust department management of larger estates, both
involving continuous supervision for a fee, instead of usually hap-
hazard and discontinuous management by the owner or a casual
adviser; or the use of Treasury bills and other more risky short-term
securities in lieu of part of the large amounts of demand deposits in
excess of day-to-day needs formerly held by the treasurers of large
corporations.
Flow of Funds Through the Five Main Capital Market Sectors
An idea of the absolute and relative magnitude of the five sectors of
the capital market with which this report deals may be gathered from
the fact that, at the end of 1958, the amounts outstanding of these
five generally marketable instruments amounted to $1004 billion, or
almost one-half of the $2082 billion of financial assets then in existence
in the United States. These five instruments showed a substantial in-
crease in outstandings in the course of the postwar period, the annual
rate of growth between 1945 and 1958 averaging 5.8 per cent. The
share of the five instruments in total financial assets, however, re-
mained unchanged at approximately one-half. Of the increase of
$523 billion in the value of the five instruments outstanding, more
than one-half reflected the sharp rise in stock prices during the second
9SeeRoland I. Robinson, Postwar Market for State and Local Government Se-
curities, Princeton for NBER, 1960, pp.112if.
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part of the period. The net amount of funds raised through these five
instruments amounted to only $246 billion, or nearly $20 billion a
year.
TREASURY SECURITIES
The market for Treasury securities occupied a special, and particu-
larly important, position in the American postwar capital market.
Short-term Treasury securities came to constitute one of the most im-
portant forms of holding the liquid reserves of business and financial
institutions, competing here primarily with demand and time deposits
in commercial banks and with certain other short-term instruments.
After World War II Treasury securities—primarily those of a maturity
up to one year—became the balancing item in the portfolios not only
of most financial institutions, but also of many large nonfinancial cor-
porations. This means that Treasury securities are usually not the
first choice of any substantial group of private investors, but are
acquired when the assets in which financial institutions or nonfinan-
cial corporations prefer to invest their funds are not available in
sufficient amounts or on satisfactory terms, and that Treasury securi-
ties are liquidated when the demand for these other assets is high.
Only in the postwar period did this role of Treasury securities as
the balancing item in the portfolios of most investor groups become
evident, although a trend in that direction could be detected since
World War I. The development, of course, was caused by the sharp
increase during World War II in the volume of Treasury securities
outstanding, both in absolute and relative terms.
While the amount of Treasury securities outstanding changed but
little over the entire postwar period, three investor groups expanded
their holdings substantially, both in absolute and relative terms: gov-
ernment insurance and pension funds, which absorbed $30 billion of
Treasury securities, and thus increased their holdings by 125 per cent;
state and local governments, whose net purchases of $6 billion en-
larged their holdings by about 120 per cent; and foreigners, who
tripled their holdings acquiring on balance fully $5 billion of Treas-
ury securities. The Federal Reserve banks, although making net pur-
chases of $2 billion, increased their holdings by only 9 per cent.
Among domestic private financial institutions, only two groups added
appreciably to their holdings: fire and casualty insurance companies,
which increased their holdings by two-thirds by adding nearly $214
billion, and savings and loan associations which increased them by 60
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per cent through net acquisition of less than $1 1/2 billion of Treasury
securities.
All these purchases were almost offset by the massive net sales of
commercial banks, totaling more than $24 billion, or 27 per cent of
their holdings, at the end of 1945; and of life insurance companies,
which liquidated 65 per cent of their holdings at the beginning of the
period by net sales of $13.5 billion of Treasury securities. Substantial
sales, absolutely or relatively, were also made by mutual savings banks
and nonfinancial corporations. The holdings of nonfarm households
in 1958 were smaller by $1 billion compared to 1945, but this amounted
to a relatively small decline of 2 per cent in their holdings.
The differences among investor groups were most pronounced in
Cycle I when large liquidation of Treasury securities by banks and
life insurance companies, totaling $18 billion and $5 billion for the
full cycle, were absorbed almost exclusively by the U.S. government,
either by retirement of securities or by acquisitions on behalf of its
pension and insurance funds. The net sale or purchase balances of the
different groups were smaller in Cycle II and still smaller in Cycle III.
Government funds continued to be the main net buyers of Treasury
securities, while life insurance companies and mutual savings banks
were the main sellers, joined in Cycle III by commercial banks and
nonfinancial corporations.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
The demand for state and local government securities during the post-
war period was limited essentially to three investor groups—commer-
cial banks, fire and casualty insurance companies, and individuals with
high incomes—and depended on the funds available for investment
by these groups, on interest rate differentials, and on income tax
rates. The supply of tax-exempt securities, on the other hand, was
mainly determined by the difference between the capital expenditures
of the state and local government and their gross savings (current in-
come minus current expenditure, excluding capital consumption al-
lowances).
Of total net purchases of state and local government securities of
$40 billion, households absorbed only 32 per cent, compared to their
share in holdings of well over one-half at the beginning of the postwar
period. More than 60 per cent of the net supply of state and local
government securities remained to be absorbed by financial institu-
tions. Commercial banks alone took more than 30 per cent and fire
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and casualty insurance companies 15 per cent; these are the two
groups among financial institutions for which the tax exemption of
state and local government securities is of the greatest value because
their income is subject to the full corporate income tax.
Compared to the differences in the trend of holdings and net ac-
quisitions of state and local government securities over the entire
postwar period, differences in the distribution among the main holder
groups from one of the three postwar cycles to another were moderate.
Thus, the share of all financial institutions together in the net supply
of state and local government securities in the three cycles varied only
from 61 to 65 to 54 per cent. Variations were, of course, more pro-
nounced for individual groups of financial institutions. Thus, the
share of commercial banks declined from two-fifths of the total in the
first cycle to only one-fifth in the third cycle, while that of fire and
casualty insurance companies rose from one-twelfth in the first cycle
to about one-sixth in the second and third cycles.'°
CORPORATE BONDS
Between 1945 and 1958 the volume of corporate bonds more than
tripled, from $27to$89 billion, an average annual rate of increase
of 9'/2 per cent; the intercyclical changes point toward an upward
trend. Reflecting the substantial rate of growth of corporate bonds
outstanding, the average annual increase rose from $3.6 billion in
Cycle I to $4.2 billion in Cycle II and to $6.5 billion in Cycle III.
The volume of new bond offerings, of course, was considerably higher
because some of the new issues were used to retire outstanding issues.
The ratio between net increase in bonds outstanding and bond offer-
ings was two-thirds in 1946—49 and 1949—54 and three-fourths in 1954—
58.
Of total bond offerings of. about $90 billion, approximately 30 per
cent each were issued by manufacturing companies and by electric
and gas utilities. Communication enterprises, primarily th.e Bell sys-
tem, accounted for 10 per cent, and the railroads for 5 per cent. The
last fourth of corporate bond offerings was divided among finance
companies, and real estate, trade, and miscellaneous corporations. The
distribution of bond offerings among the main industries did not
differ significantly from one cycle to the other.
Corporate bonds provided approximately one-tenth of total financ-
i.OStateand local government securities are discussed in greater detail in Chap.
ter 7
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ing, over one-fifth of external financing, and over one-fourth of
debt financing of nonfinancial corporations. These ratios would be
slightly higher if term loans by banks were included. The relative
importance of corporate bonds as a means of financing was fairly stable
during the three cycles, particularly if bonds are related to total net
sources of funds.
The proportion of corporate bonds placed directly with institu-
tional investors came close to one-half for the entire postwar period.
It was highest, at slightly above 50 per cent, in Cycle II. Most indus-
trial subdivisions followed the main pattern. The share of private
placements, however, varied widely among industries, ranging from
3 per cent for railroads to about 90 per cent for other transportation.
Of the two most important issuer groups, electric utilities had an
average ratio of direct placements of about 30 per cent since many
regulatory agencies prescribe offerings through competitive bidding,
while direct placements accounted for almost two-thirds of the bond
offerings of manufacturing corporations.
The outstanding characteristics of the distribution of net purchases
of corporate bonds during the postwar period was the dominance of
financial institutions. For the period as a whole, holdings of corporate
bonds by financial institutions increased by $57 billion, while the total
amount outstanding rose by $61 billion. Financial institutions ab-
sorbed only about three-fourths of the total increase in Cycle III after
their purchases had been virtually as large as the entire increase in
the supply in Cycles I and II.
Among financial institutions, the insurance sector was the pre-
dominant buyer of corporate bonds, and here again private life insur-
ance companies were the decisive source of demand. For the entire
postwar period the increase in the holdings by life insurance com-
panies amounted to slightly more than one-half of the total increase
in corporate bonds outstanding. Inclusion of private and govern-
ment insurance funds brings the share to four-fifths of the total, and
to about nine-tenths of the absorption of corporate bonds for all
financial institutions. Net purchases by commercial banks were vir-
tually nil, but at least part of their term loans are very similar in
character to directly placed corporate bonds. If term loans with a
maturity of more than five years are included, the share of commer-
cial banks in the net issuance of corporate bonds would rise to about
one-tenth of the total."
ii.Corporatebonds are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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COMMON STOCK
The market for common stock in the postwar period had two out-
standing features. First, new common stock issues were remarkably
small compared to the issuance of other capital market instruments,
to the volume of internal and external finance of corporations, to the
value of common stock outstanding, and to the total assets of most
investor groups. Second, trading in common stock was very large, and
the resulting shifts in the portfolios of the different investor groups
were substantial and of considerable importance for the smooth func-
tioning of the capital market.
Net issues of corporate stock from 1946 through 1958 amounted to
nearly $34 billion (excluding $7billionof investment company issues),
of which $29 billion represented common stock. These figures include
both marketable and nonmarketable issues of small and new corpora-
tions. The statistics of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
are limited to marketable issues, show stock issues of only $17 billion
excluding investment companies.12
New issues of common stock showed a considerable upward trend
throughout the postwar period, the annual average rising from $1.6
billion in Cycle I to $2.5 billion in Cycle II and $3.9 billion in Cycle
III. This increase, however, was smaller than the expansion in the
rate of absorption of other main capital market instruments, other
than U.S. government securities, by investors. As a result, the share of
common stock in the net issuance of the five main capital market in-
struments declined from one-fifth in Cycle I to one-ninth in Cycle II
and it was one-seventh in Cycle III.
For the entire postwar period, common stocks provided 5 per cent
of the total funds absorbed by all nonfinancial corporations and the
ratio was approximately the same for all three cycles. In relation to
total external financing, common stocks contributed about one-eighth,
again without substantial changes among the three cycles. Common
stocks supplied nearly three-fifths as large a volume of funds as corpo-
rate bonds did, and an even smaller proportion if bank term loans
of five years' maturity or longer are included with bonds.
Stocks accounted for only 2 per cent of the aggregate financing of
manufacturing and mining corporations, and 24 per cent of that of
public utilities and communications, but contributed virtually nothing
12 This does not include convertible bonds exchanged for common stock.
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to the funds secured by corporations in transportation and trade. The
share of stock in the external financing of these groups was similarly
varied. It amounted to only 5 per cent for manufacturing and mining
corporations, to 38 per cent among public utilities, and was negligible
again for transportation and trade. Compared, finally, to the total
of issuance of securities and long-term debt, stocks contributed 12 per
cent for manufacturing and mining and 43 per cent for public utilities.
For the entire postwar period, financial institutions, other than the
personal trust departments of commercial banks, had a net purchase
balance of common stock of $14 billion, equal to nearly one-half of
total net issues excluding that of investment companies which are
rarely acquired by other financial institutions.
It may be more appropriate, however, to compare the $14 billion
of net acquisition of common stock by financial institutions with
the $17 billion 13ofnew issues of marketable common stock (exclud-
ing investment company issues), since financial institutions acquire
only relatively small amounts of the nonmarketable issues of small
corporations. The share of financial institutions in the absorption of
new marketable common stock issues, then,is nearly 80 per cent.
Since stockholders other than financial institutions undoubtedly ac-
quired a substantial proportion of the new marketable issues of com-
mon stock, particularly of those offered under subscription rights,
other stockholders must, for the postwar period as a whole, have
been net sellers to financial institutions of seasoned marketable com-
mon stock other than investment company issues.
Net purchases of common stock were concentrated in two groups of
financial institutions—private pension plans and investment com-
panies—which accounted for more than two-fifths and for nearly one-
third, respectively, of all net institutional purchase of common stock.
The share of the net purchases of common stock by institutions
increased very markedly over the postwar period. While net institu-
tional purchases were equal to more than two-fifths of net new mar-
ketable common stock issues (other than those of investment com-
panies) in Cycle I, they rose to one-half in Cycle II, and advanced
further to about four-fifths in Cycle III.
The predominance of financial institutions as net buyers of mar-
ketable common stock other than investment company issues is still
more dramatically illustrated by the fact that net noninstitutional
13Thisfigure includes cash issue alone and not the common stock issue resulting
from bond conversion.
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absorption of such securities averaged only $0.6 billion a year over the
postwar period, and that, contrary to most capital market measures,
this absorption did not increase from cycle to cycle.
Although little is known definitely about net purchases and sales
of common stock, and hence about shifts of holdings, among groups
of domestic individual investors, there are some indications that in-
vestors of moderate means and in the younger age groups made net
acquisitions while large and older investors had either no net purchase
balance or a net sales balance. The shift involved is probably small
compared to the total value of total stock outstanding and is not likely
to have changed the degree of concentration of ownership of common
stock substantially. Both in 1958 and in 1945 a very large proportion of
all common stock was in the hands of a relatively small proportion of
families.
For the period 1946—58 aggregate net purchases of common stock
of all types represented 3 per cent of total nonf arm households' sav-
ings. Net purchases of marketable common stock alone were equiva-
lent to 2 per cent of individual saving. Exclusion of investment com-
pany stock reduces the share to I per cent. Net purchases of common
stock of whichever scope thus constituted only a minor outlet of all
current saving for all individuals taken
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGES
The flow of capital funds in the market for residential mortgages dur-
ing the postwar period is characterized by five developments: (1) the
extraordinarily rapid rise of the volume of residential mortgage debt,
slowed only from 1951 to 1953 because of the Korean War and gov-
ernment limitations on residential construction and mortgage lending;
(2) a persistent rise in interest rates; (3) a marked increase in the posi-
tion of financial institutions as mortgage lenders; (4) the pervasive
influence of the federal government on many aspects of the market
and the resulting tendency toward standardization of many aspects
of the residential mortgage as a capital market instrument; (5) the
development of new techniques adapted to the special environment
created by government interference and institutionalization.
Between the end of 1945, when the residential mortgage debt was
not higher than in the mid-1920's, and 1958, the total mortgage debt
on residential real estate increased from $23 to $133 billion. The rate
14Commonstock is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9.
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of increase of 141/2 per cent per year was one of the highest, and the
absolute increase in the volume of residential mortgages of $110 bil-
lion was by far the largest, among the main capital market instru-
ments.
Life insurance companies and mutual savings banks were the main
buyers of insured home mortgages, each accounting for more than
one-fourth of the total. Commercial banks and savings and loan asso-
ciations followed with about one-seventh and one-fifth, respectively,
and federal agencies with about one-twelfth. This left not much for
all other holders. Savings and loan associations were by far the most
important lenders on uninsured home mortgages, accounting for more
than one-half of the total. Commercial banks and life insurance com-
panies have followed at a great distance, holding about 15 per cent
of the total each. Noninstitutional lenders are credited with one-eighth
of all uninsured home mortgages, a considerable part of which was rep-
resented by junior liens. Mutual savings banks were the most impor-
tant factor in the market for multifamily mortgages, absorbing over
one-third of the postwar period total. Life insurance companies and
noninstitutional lenders absorbed one-fifth each, and savings and loan
associations supplied one-sixth of the funds to this market.
The main change in the sources of funds for residential mortgages
during the postwar period is the high share of life insurance com-
panies during the first part, particularly 1948—51, of commercial banks
particularly in 1946—47, and of savings and loan associations particu-
larly during the second part of the period. In 1948—51 life insurance
companies absorbed about 30 per cent of total net residential mortgage
loans, savings and loan associations less than 25 per cent, and commer-
cial banks about 15 per cent. From 1952 through 1958, on the other
hand, life insurance companies accounted for under 20 per cent of the
absorption of residential mortgages, their share even declining to 10
per cent in 1957—58, while savings and loan associations increased
their share to an average of over 40 per cent and to nearly one-half
in 1957—58.
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